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SPECIAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INVOLVING FEDERAL AGENCIES
WILLIAM A. WILCOX, JR.t
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government is one of the largest, if not the largest,
industries in the United States. It is the largest landholder, owning
millions of acres. It conducts training and construction operations
with major environmental impacts and operates thousands of in-
dustrial-style facilities with a constant waste stream. Tanks maneu-
ver through our forests, ships dock at our ports, jets soar through
our skies and rockets and satellites orbit our planet. The federal
government builds - or provides the funding for - prisons, high-
ways, dams, power plants, office buildings, hospitals, laboratories,
industrial shops, ammunition and hazardous material storage facili-
ties, airplane hangars and motor pools. It drops explosive ord-
nance on the land and in the sea. The federal government is
responsible for cattle grazing and hard rock mining on public lands
and logging in national forests. The scope of the federal govern-
ment's activity is awesome. Yet, it seems that the federal govern-
ment plays by its own rules in regulating environmental and natural
resources.
State regulators and the public are often frustrated or con-
fused by the special body of environmental law that applies to the
federal government. When dealing with the federal government
under environmental and natural resources law, special issues often
arise involving environmental regulation and environmental plan-
ning. If practitioners can gain an understanding of these common
issues, this understanding will demystify the special body of environ-
mental law applicable to the federal government.
t Environmental Attorney, Resource Sustainment and Restoration Branch,
Environmental Law Division, United States Army Legal Services Agency, Arlington,
Virginia. B.A., Knox College; M.A., University of Illinois at Springfield; J.D., Uni-
versity of Wyoming; LL.M., University of Kent at Canterbury (England). At the
time of this writing, the author was assigned as a senior assistant attorney general
for the State of Wyoming. The views expressed in this article are those of the au-
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or of the United States Government.
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
A. Civil Penalties and Sovereign Immunity
The principle of sovereign immunity is perhaps the most mis-
understood of the special issues arising in environmental regulation
of the federal government's activities. Under sovereign immunity,
only Congress can waive the federal government's immunity to law-
suits. States may regulate activities of federal agencies only after
receiving "clear and unambiguous" authorization from Congress.'
However, each of the major environmental statutes provides a lim-
ited waiver of sovereign immunity requiring federal facilities to
comply with state laws. 2 Normally, federal and state regulators have
broad power to enforce pollution control requirements. If a facility
violates any of the numerous pollution standards, then the regula-
tors have several civil remedies at their disposal, including injunc-
tive relief." Limited waivers of sovereign immunity generally have
not given states the power to fine federal facilities, although state
attorneys general contend that these waivers do allow states to as-
sess fines or civil penalties against the federal government.4 The
Supreme Court's decision in Department of Energy v. Ohio reinforced
the view that sovereign immunity waivers may not include civil pen-
alties.5 However, in dicta, the Court opined that some circum-
stances could arise under which the Clean Water Act (CWA) waiver
might allow for civil penalties as "coercive sanctions."6
In 1992, Congress adopted the Federal Facilities Compliance
Act (FFCA), which amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA)
- commonly known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) - allowing states to assess civil penalties against federal in-
stallations for noncompliance. 7 The FFCA, however, applied only
1. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200, 211 (1976) (noting when states can regulate federal agency activities
under Congressional authorization).
2. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6 (2001); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2001); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961 (2001); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (2001) (each providing for limited
waiver).
3. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2001) (stating civil remedies available to
regulators).
4. Id. (addressing argument by state attorneys general of rights granted by
waivers).
5. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 611 (1992) (holding that statutes
unambiguously waived immunity from civil penalties).
6. Id. at 615-620 (noting circumstances when waiver might allow civil
penalties).
7. Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat.
1505 (1992) [hereinafter FFCA]. The FFCA addressed not only sovereign immu-
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to solid and hazardous waste. 8 The FFCA's waiver of sovereign im-
munity did not apply to other environmental statutes.9 Congress
has since passed similar legislation for the lead exposure amend-
ments to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)10 and the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA).II
The underlying premise supporting sovereign immunity
originates from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
is "exemplified in the Plenary Powers Clause of the Constitution."'' 2
This authority established that states could not constitutionally reg-
ulate federal activities unless Congress consented to such regula-
tion. Congress, however, has not always crafted clear sovereign
immunity language. Therefore, courts have developed rules of in-
terpretation when sovereign immunity is claimed based on ambigu-
ous language.' 3 The rules of interpretation, outlined in McClellan
Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger, state that a waiver of
sovereign immunity cannot be recognized unless it is "clear, concise
and unequivocal." 14 Further, "if there is any doubt, waiver will not
be found. Waiver cannot be implied, nor will it be presumed. It
cannot be based on speculation, surmise or conjecture. 1 5 The Su-
preme Court reiterated this premise in Department of Energy v. Ohio,
in which the Court determined that the Department of Energy
could not be fined for past violations of the RCRA or the CWA. 16
nity but also other federal government concerns, such as development of rules
governing military munitions disposals. Id. § 107.
8. Id. (explaining that FFCA applies only to solid and hazardous waste).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 6991f (2001) (discussing regulation of underground storage
tanks).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2688 (2001) (noting that United States has not waived sover-
eign immunity under employee protection of Toxic Substances Control Act [here-
inafter TSCA]).
11. 42 U.S.C. 300j-6 (stating that non-primary state may impose various state
laws upon federal public water systems).
12. See Lt. Colonel Richard E. Lotz, Federal Facility Provisions of Federal Environ-
mental Statutes: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for "Requirements" and Fines and Penalties,
31 A.F. L. REv. 7, 8 (1989) (citing court's analysis of waivers of sovereign immunity
in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976)); see also U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 17
(stating plenary powers of Congress).
13. See generally Hancock, 426 U.S. 167 (establishing limitations on states with-
out Congressional consent).
14. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182,
1187 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (noting impermissible use of waiver if language not "clear,
concise and unequivocal").
15. See id. at 1187 (emphasizing that waiver cannot be based on speculation).
16. See Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615-629 (1992) (stating that De-
partment of Energy could not be fined for past violations of RCRA or CWA due to
unclear waiver).
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With regard to environmental statutes, the Supreme Court's
1976 decision in Hancock v. Train prompted a new legislative trend
toward more clearly drafted waivers of sovereign immunity.17 In
Hancock, the Supreme Court held that state permit requirements
did not apply to federal installations.1 8 Congress responded by
amending the federal facility provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA),
the CWA and the SDWA and passed a more carefully drafted sover-
eign immunity waiver with the RCRA. 19 The waiver language in
these environmental statutes, although similar, is not uniform.
Therefore, practitioners must carefully examine each waiver sepa-
rately to fully understand its applications.
The language of section 1323(a) of the CWA provides for the
waiver of sovereign immunity in a number of areas. For example,
section 1323(a) of the CWA requires federal installations to "com-
ply with all Federal, State, Interstate, and local requirements, ad-
ministrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and
to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity including the
payment of reasonable service charges. '20 Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Hancock, Congress added that the waiver "shall
apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural
(including any recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any re-
quirement respecting permits and any other requirement, whatso-
ever)."21 The section further waives immunity "to any process and
sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in
any other manner."22 The CWA waiver also provides that the fed-
eral government may remove any sanction against it to federal dis-
trict court and that no officer or employee of the federal
government can be held liable for fines arising from "performance
of his official duties."23 Finally, the "United States shall be liable
only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed
17. Lotz, supra note 12, at 11 (addressing importance of Hancock regarding
waivers of sovereign immunity).
18. See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 168 (stating Supreme Court's holding).
19. See id. (noting Congress's reaction to Hancock by passing carefdly drafted
waiver).
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000) (defining requirements of federal installa-
tions under CWA).
21. Id. (noting addition to application of waiver under CWA).
22. Id. (emphasizing waiver of immunity to any process or sanction whether
enforced by federal, state or local courts).
23. Id. (stating federal government right to remove sanction under CWA
waiver).
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by State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such
court."24
In Department of Energy v. Ohio, the Court's decision on the
CWA sovereign immunity waiver hinged, among other things, on
the interpretation of the term "process and sanctions."25 The State
of Ohio had sought penalties for violations of state and federal pol-
lution laws - including the CWA and the RCRA - at the Depart-
ment of Energy's uranium processing plant in Fernald, Ohio.2 6
The state contended that the "federal facilities" and "citizen-suit"
sections of the CWA effectively waived sovereign immunity for fines.
Ohio argued that the word "sanction" in the CWA's federal facilities
section was intended to encompass punitive fines.27 The Supreme
Court, however, held that any waiver of sovereign immunity must
be clear and unequivocal. 28 The CWA sovereign immunity waiver
also failed to meet the test for punitive fines.29
The CWA is unique in that, pursuant to its language, a state
may likely succeed in recovering "coercive sanctions." The Court
opined that states could impose civil penalties if assessed as "coer-
cive sanctions."'30 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter stated that
the language of the CWA waiver that federal facilities "shall be sub-
ject to ... all Federal, State and local.., sanctions" indicated Con-
gress's intent to allow civil penalties when used as a coercive tool in
instruments such as court orders or judgments.31 Justice Souter
also found support for this interpretation in the following lan-
guage: the "United States shall be liable only for those civil penal-
ties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court
to enforce an order or the process of such court. ' 32 The Department
of Energy v. Ohio dicta indicates that, under the CWA waiver, local
courts may be able to issue compliance orders followed by con-
24. Id. (clarifying instance when federal government is liable for civil
penalties).
25. See Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. 607, 620-23 (noting importance of term "pro-
cess and sanctions" in court's decision).
26. See id. at 612 (addressing claim of state of Ohio).
27. See id. at 620 (stating argument by Ohio that punitive fines are appropri-
ate under CWA).
28. See id. at 627 (noting that narrow construction takes waiver no further
than coercive variety).
29. Id. (explaining narrower waiver with greater antecedent text evinces
greater clarity).
30. See Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 624 (noting "civil penalties" exemplify those
imposed by state or local court to enforce order or process of such court).
31. Id. at 623-24 (stating that proviso is unlike preceding text speaking of
"civil penalties" in that it still clarifies waiver of scope).
32. Id. at 624 (noting confirmation of previous waiver clarification).
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tempt citations for violations, and possibly even stipulated penalties.
This latter passage is unique to the CWA. Therefore, a state seek-
ing "coercive sanctions" pursuant to any other environmental stat-
ute would be less likely to succeed.
In response to Department of Energy v. Ohio, Congress signifi-
cantly altered the reach of sovereign immunity under the RCRA by
passing the FFCA.3 3 Under the FFCA, state and federal regulators
clearly can assess fines against federal facilities for violating solid
and hazardous waste laws. In its present form, the federal facilities
provision of the RCRA provides that the federal government be
subject to "all administrative orders and all civil and administrative
penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or fines
are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated, inter-
mittent, or continuing violations. '34 Furthermore, "[t]he United
States hereby expressly waives any immunity otherwise applicable to
the United States with respect to any such substantive or procedural
requirement (including, but not limited to, any injunctive relief,
administrative order or civil or administrative penalty or fine re-
ferred to in the preceding sentence, or reasonable service
charge)."35 With the FFCA, Congress rendered obsolete any case
law holding that the RCRA waiver of sovereign immunity was not
"clear and unequivocal." The FFCA clarified the meaning of "rea-
sonable service charge" to include charges in connection with
processing necessary paperwork "as well as any other nondiscrimi-
natory charges that are assessed in connection with a ... solid or
hazardous waste regulatory program."" The FFCA also empowers
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to initiate admin-
istrative actions against federal facilities.57 While the FFCA states
that the federal government is liable in RCRA actions "for isolated,
intermittent, or continuing violations," federal facilities still have a
defense against actions for past violations. President Bush, in his
adoption press release, stated his belief that the FFCA was ratified
"notwithstanding the holding of the Supreme Court in Gwaltney of
33. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000).
34. Id. (outlining federal, state, interstate and local substantive and procedu-
ral requirements of RCRA).
35. Id. (preserving federal waiver of sovereign immunity and describing cir-
cumstances for application).
36. Id. (clarifying service charge to encompass all federal, state and local
costs).
37. Id. (noting that action would occur in same manner and circumstances as
action against any other person).
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Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation."411 In Gwaltney, the
Court held that the Chesapeake Bay Foundation could not compel
the meat-packer defendant to pay civil penalties for wholly past per-
mit violations but rather was required to allege that such violations
were likely to continue.3 9
Various federal agencies sought to limit the reach of the
FFCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. In particular, the Depart-
ment of Defense argued that the FFCA, by its own terms, applies
only to solid and hazardous waste regulation - that it does not
apply to other environmental laws, such as the RCRA sections gov-
erning underground storage tanks (USTs). 40 Section 9007 of the
RCRA provides its own waiver of sovereign immunity governing
USTs that is comparable to other sovereign immunity waivers in
substance and scope. 4' The agencies argued that section 9007 pro-
vided the exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity for UST regula-
tion. The EPA, however, began assessing penalties against federal
facilities in 1998 for failure to meet UST compliance deadlines.
The Department of Defense requested an opinion from the Depart-
ment ofJustice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to clarify the issue.
In an opinion dated June 14, 2000, the OLC concluded that "RCRA
clearly grants EPA the authority to assess penalties against federal
agencies for UST violations." 42 Without relying on the FFCA waiver
of sovereign immunity as authority, the OLC determined that sec-
tion 9006 (a) (1) of subtitle I of the RCRA gave the EPA authority to
issue administrative compliance orders to "any person. ' 43 Further,
the OLC found that section 9006(c) gave the EPA authority to "as-
sess a penalty, if any, which the Administrator determines is reason-
able taking into account the seriousness of the violation and any
good faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements. 44
Under section 9001 of the RCRA, the definition of "person" in-
38. Press Release, President Bush, Statement on Signing Legislation Waiving
Federal Immunity Relating to Solid and Hazardous Waste (Oct. 6, 1992).
39. See generally Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (requiring reasonable likelihood past polluter will continue to pollute).
40. Id.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991f(a) (2000) (outlining government's environmental
responsibility as no different from that of private individuals).
42. Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel, Department of Defense,
and The General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Assessment of
Penalties Against Federal Agencies for Violation of the Underground Storage Tank Require-
ments of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (June 14, 2000) (noting that EPA's
UST field citation procedures violate neither RCRA nor Constitution).
43. Id., (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(a)(1) (noting application to underground
storage tanks)).
44. Id., (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(c) (citing subtitle 1)).
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cludes "the United States Government."4 5 Further, the OLC deter-
mined that, while the FFCA may have given states authority only to
assess civil penalties for hazardous or solid waste violations, the fed-
eral facilities provision of the RCRA gave the EPA Administrator
broader authority to assess fines against federal agencies. 4"
Federal agencies still resist civil penalties assessed by states
under UST regulations because the FFCA and the OLC opinion did
not specifically address USTs. Section 9007 of the RCRA, its waiver
of sovereign immunity for USTs,47 is similar to other sovereign im-
munity waivers. It differs, however, in several important respects
that may prove crucial when state regulators deal with federal facili-
ties. As with other federal facilities sections, Congress has waived
sovereign immunity against "all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements" for USTs.4 8 Section 9007, however, does not waive
sovereign immunity explicitly against "process and sanctions," as do
the other environmental sovereign immunity waivers. 49 The waiver
only mentions "process or sanction" regarding injunctive reme-
dies. 5" Therefore, Justice Souter's dicta in Department of Energy v.
Ohio, indicating that states could impose civil penalties under the
CWA if imposed as "coercive sanctions," cannot be construed to al-
low stipulated penalties for USTs. Justice Souter's discussion fo-
cused on the use of the term "sanction" in the CWA waiver. 5 1
Accordingly, a state cannot make a credible argument for stipulated
penalties regarding USTs. The absence of the "process and sanc-
tion" language in the UST sovereign immunity waiver represents
sound public policy. The UST amendment regulates USTs that
may have been placed in the ground many years ago. As with the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 52 the UST amendments prima-
rily address and attempt to correct pre-existing conditions, unlike
the prospective compliance programs of the other statutes.
45. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6991(6) (reinforcing strongly supported view that
United States is not exempt)).
46. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b)(1) (noting enforcement follows to any
brand of federal government pursuant to this title)).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991f(a) (noting that all federal agencies are subject to
compliance).
48. Id. (extending jurisdiction in same manner and extent as any other
person).
49. Id. (including all agents, officers or employees of United States).
50. Id. (stemming from enforcement actions).
51. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 622-23 (noting that government's
corresponding liability extends only to process and sanction).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (outlining comprehensive environmental re-
sponse, compensation and liability statutes).
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During the 1990s, most federal facilities upgraded USTs to
meet required standards. Allowing the federal government to be
fined for mistakes predating passage of the UST amendments
would not be in the public's interest because it would serve no cor-
rective purpose. Further, the FFCA applies only to environmental
laws aimed at regulating solid and hazardous wastes. For example,
the sovereign immunity principle traditionally has included exemp-
tion from local building codes and zoning ordinances.53 There-
fore, if a local government attempts to limit a federal facility's solid
waste activities, such as landfills, through zoning restrictions, sover-
eign immunity would still exempt the activity despite the FFCA.
As with the CWA, the federal government under section 118 of
the CAA is required to comply with "all Federal, State, interstate
and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions" regarding air pollution "in the same manner, and to the
same extent, as any nongovernmental entity. '54 However, regard-
ing the payment of fines under the CAA, there is a split of authority
in the federal courts that has yet to be resolved. Although the lan-
guage of the CAA waiver of sovereign immunity is substantially simi-
lar to the language the Supreme Court considered in Department of
Energy v. Ohio, the Sixth Circuit has held that the savings clause of
the CAA's citizen suit provision contains an independent waiver of
sovereign immunity authorizing state-imposed punitive civil fines.55
In Georgia, however, a federal district court has held that the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of similar federal facility section lan-
guage in Department of Energy v. Ohio is controlling.56
Because CERCLA is not a compliance statute in the nature of
the CWA, the CAA and the RCRA, the federal facilities section of
CERCLA operates substantially differently from the other environ-
mental statutes.57 Pursuant to CERCLA section 120, federal facili-
ties are liable for the clean-up costs of hazardous waste sites for
53. See generally United States v. Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1944); United
States v. Philadelphia, 56 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affd, 147 F.2d 291 (3d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 870 (1945) (attempting to enjoin City of Chester from
obstructing building of housing project).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a).
55. See United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529, 534-35
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that CAA waives United States' sovereign immunity from
state civil penalties for past violations of state air pollution laws).
56. United States v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 897 F. Supp. 1464, 1471
(N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that CAA does not waive sovereign immunity for civil
fines of punitive nature); but see City of Jacksonville v. Navy, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1352
(M.D. Fla. 2002).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (a) (1) (explaining that federal government shall com-
ply with this section as nongovernment entities do).
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which they are responsible. 58 Normally, one may sue the federal
government for releasing hazardous substances. Under CERCLA,
however, no provision for punitive fines exists. Stipulated penalties,
however, arguably could be included in a consent decree that
would set cleanup milestones. 59 Under CERCLA's enforcement
section, stipulated penalties of up to $25,000 per day may be in-
cluded in a consent decree. 6" However, a federal agency could still
argue that Congress has not "clearly and unequivocally" waived sov-
ereign immunity for state regulation.
One creative way in which state regulators can hold federal fa-
cilities accountable, especially in situations in which punitive fines
are questionable, is through supplemental environmental projects
(SEPs). Under SEPs, a federal facility may agree to establish proac-
tive environmental programs in lieu of penalties. This approach is
often better for the environment and can avoid contentious wran-
gling over applicability of punitive fines, although the federal
agency may resist agreeing to SEPs if it is well established under an
environmental statute that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity
for civil penalties. If an agreement for a SEP can be reached, it
avoids the questionable public policy of fining one taxpayer funded
agency by another.6
B. Sovereign Immunity and the Applicability of State Law
Under the principle of sovereign immunity, federal environ-
mental attorneys may also argue that certain state regulatory
schemes are completely inapplicable to federal activities. This issue
is emerging now between state regulators and federal agencies, with
federal agencies contending that the scope of each environmental
waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to the scope of the federal
law. For example, numerous cases have held that the CWA does
not apply to groundwater. 2 Therefore, federal agencies can argue
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (2) (applying federal facilities section to federal
government).
59. See id. § 9621 (b) (detailing general rules for clean-up standards).
60. See id. § 9621 (e) (2) (stating "[e]ach consent decree shall also contain stip-
ulated penalties for violations of the decree in an amount not to exceed
$25,000.").
61. See David Howlett, Environmental Provisions of NDAA forFY01, 7 ENW'L. L.
Div. BULL. 10, 12 (Oct. 2000) (explaining that, in Section 315 of National Defense
Authorization Act for 2001, for instance, Congress approved expenditure of
$993,000 for hazardous substance management system at Walter Reed Army Medi-
cal Center in satisfaction of fine imposed by EPA).
62. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2001)
(affirming judgment where clear that Congressional intent of federal statute was
not to govern discharges on dry land that seeped into ground water); see also Vill.
[Vol. XIV: p. 39
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that the waiver of sovereign immunity under the CWA does not ap-
ply to ground water regulation by states. 63 Rather, these claims fall
under the sovereign immunity waiver of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, which is restricted by the scope of the Act to underground in-
jection and wellhead protection. 64 Further, depending on applica-
ble facts, federal agencies may argue that state above-ground
storage tank programs are inapplicable because there is no federal
counterpart and therefore no waiver of sovereign immunity.
C. Payment of Reasonable Fees
Each of the federal facilities provisions of the environmental
statutes provides that federal facilities have waived sovereign immu-
nity to pay "reasonable" administrative fees or service charges. 65
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, how-
ever, the federal government does not pay taxes to the state. 66 To
determine whether a charge is payable as a "fee" or must be paid
because it is a "tax," federal government attorneys must examine
the charges in light of the three prong test set forth in Massachusetts
v. United States.67 First, the attorney must determine that the charge
is nondiscriminatory in its application. 68 That is, the charge cannot
disproportionately penalize the federal agency as compared with
nonfederal entities. Second, the attorney must determine that the
charge is a fair approximation of the "benefits" the facility receives
of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating "[t]he omission of groundwaters from the regulations is not an
oversight.").
63. N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 6.2.1201 (2002) (listing New Mexico Ground
and Surface Water Protection Regulations).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6 (requiring substantive and procedural compliance by
federal government).
65. See id. (stating that all branches of federal government must comply with
requirements involving ground water); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2001)
(detailing federal facilities pollution control as it relates to ground water); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (outlining federal respon-
sibilities and application of federal, state and local law to federal facilities); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (explaining compliance with control of pollution from
federal facilities and presidential exemptions).
66. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 455 (1978) (stating "im-
munity of the Federal Government from state taxation is bottomed on the
Supremacy Clause."); U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17 (restricting power of states to
tax federal government).
67, See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. at 454-67 (laying out three-prong
test in its entirety).
68. See id. at 454-63 (noting nondiscriminatory taxing measure operating to
defray cost of federal program is no more offensive than tax on income earned by
state employees).
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from the state. 69 If the charge is for some service for which the
federal government is not eligible, for instance, such as a remedia-
tion fund for leaking USTs, then the federal government cannot
pay the fee. Finally, the federal attorney must determine that the
state structured the charge to produce revenues that will not ex-
ceed the total cost to the state of providing the benefits to be sup-
plied.70 If a state charges a fee that produces revenue for the
general revenue fund for use in other programs, then it is consid-
ered a tax which the federal agency cannot pay.71
III. ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING
A. The National Environmental Policy Act
The major environmental planning statute is the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA). The NEPA requires that federal
agencies analyze the effects of an action on the environment when
taking any "major [f] ederal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment."72 The implementing regulations, de-
veloped by the White House Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), establish rules for conducting the type of environmental
analysis required for a given activity or project. 7-3 Federal agencies
have further elaborated on those regulations by adopting their own
regulations. 74
An agency must prepare different types of NEPA documenta-
tion depending on the level of possible environmental impact. If
an action or project will not adversely impact the environment, no
NEPA documentation or only minimal NEPA documentation will
be required. 75 If an action or project could cause significant envi-
ronmental impacts, the agency must prepare an environmental as-
sessment (EA). 76 An EA is intended to evaluate whether significant
69. See id. at 463-64 (citing Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542
(1950), as illustrative).
70. See id. (stating general rule for excessiveness).
71. See id. (taxing commercial aviation activity).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2001) (listing categories that must be ad-
dressed by officials before action begins).
73. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2001) (mentioning purpose, policy, com-
ments, NEPA requirements and agency compliance).
74. See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 15290 (March 29, 2002) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
§ 651) (relying on purpose, policy, comments and requirements of NEPA and
agency compliance); U.S. Dep't of Army, Final Rule, Reg. 200-2, Environmental
Effects of Army Actions.
75. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2002) (defining environmental assessment and list-
ing criteria that it serves).
76. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 651.32 (2002) (defining EA's purpose and require-
ments for preparation).
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environmental effects would likely occur as a result of an activity or
project. 77 The EA can help the agency to determine whether to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS), but an EA is not
a prerequisite to an EIS. 78 If an agency activity or project will have a
significant impact on the quality of the environment, then the
NEPA requires the agency to prepare an EIS. 79
Under their respective regulations, federal agencies have a
number of "categorical exclusions" for which NEPA environmental
documentation is not required. These categorical exclusions con-
sist of routine actions, such as maintenance and repair, that the
participating agencies have determined do not affect the environ-
ment either as an individual project or when considered together
with other projects. The use of such categorical exclusions is en-
couraged under the CEQ regulations.80 An EA is appropriate if a
categorical exclusion does not apply to a proposed action or project
and some minor environmental damage could occur.81
If an EA is completed and results in a "finding of no significant
impact (FONSI)," then the NEPA requires no further environmen-
tal analysis. If the proposed action would cause significant environ-
mental impact, however, then the agency must conduct an EIS,
which is the highest level of environmental analysis.8 2 In addition,
an agency may complete a higher level of analysis on a project than
is required. Conducting an EIS analysis allows a federal agency to
prepare and to present matters regarding controversial proposals.
In a few select circumstances, an agency may also determine that,
although completing an EIS would not be legally necessary, it
would be prudent to conduct the EIS for strategic purposes, such as
to garner public support for a proposed action or project. 83
77. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 651.35 (2002) (describing decision process of EA re-
suiting in either finding of no significant impact [hereinafter FNSI] or environ-
mental impact statement [hereinafter EIS]).
78. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2002) (stating environmental assessment [herein-
after EA] not necessary if agency decides to prepare environmental impact
statement).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2001) (stating "a detailed statement by the
responsible official" on the EIS must be made).
80. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (2002) (emphasizing reduction in excessive
paperwork).
81. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2002) (emphasizing when to prepare EA).
82. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c) (2002) (listing factors in determining whether to
prepare EIS).
83. See 40 C.F.R. §1502 (2001) (mentioning decision to complete EIS, how-
ever, would likely be made only by policy-level officials in agency).
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Major federal actions that will have an effect on the environ-
ment require NEPA documentation. 84 Which projects constitute
such actions can be a matter of contention. "Major federal actions"
can include rule-making or licensing decisions that can affect the
environment indirectly.8 5 Whether a proposed action requires an
EIS is not always obvious. Projects affecting the environment have
included a proposed low-income housing project on Manhattan's
Upper West Side 86 and a proposed jail adjacent to the federal
courthouse in New York City.8 7 In considering a court challenge to
the proposed federal jail in New York City, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit determined that the NEPA requires a
federal agency to consider at least two factors when analyzing the
environmental impacts of a proposed action:
(1) [t]he extent to which the action will cause adverse envi-
ronmental effects in excess of those created by existing
uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute quanti-
tative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, in-
cluding the cumulative harm that results from its
contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the
affected area.88
Determining whether an EA or an EIS is sufficient is highly
subjective. To ensure that the documents in either the EA or the
EIS are adequate, a federal agency environmental attorney will re-
view each document and determine whether it meets the require-
ments of the CEQ regulations. For instance, the document must
present an analysis of all reasonable alternatives, including a "no
84. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2001) (stating when agencies shall prepare envi-
ronmental assessments).
85. See Culvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing that court was not re-
viewing construction permits or operating license but commission's new rules on
how environmental concerns should be considered in individual decisions).
86. See generally Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223 (1980) (holding that Department of Housing and Urban Development did
consider environmental consequences of reclassifying proposed site from middle-
income housing to low-income housing).
87. See generally Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (deciding mem-
orandum of agency did not adequately consider environmental impact of pro-
posed office jail portion of annex and construction was enjoined until proper
consideration occurred).
88. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-831 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating factors
to consider when determining if "major federal action will 'significantly' affect"
quality of human environment).
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action" alternative.5t 9 The document must also indicate that the
agency proponent considered the issue of environmental justice -
that is, whether minority or low-income populations would dispro-
portionately suffer negative effects as a result of the proposed
action.90
The agency must apply the NEPA during the planning process
prior to making any project decisions 1 If an agency makes a deci-
sion prior to applying the NEPA and uses an EA or an EIS for a post
hoc rationalization of its decision, the agency's action is illegal and
vulnerable to a lawsuit. Under the CEQ regulations, an agency can-
not take action on a project that will "limit the choice of reasonable
alternatives."9 2 Thus, any action on a project that would predispose
a federal agency to a particular decision, such as awarding a con-
tract to begin preparation work, makes the action vulnerable to a
lawsuit.
A common error that proponents of federal projects make in
preparation of an EA or EIS is "segmentation," or "piecemealing,"
which is the practice of dividing a single action "into component
parts, each involving actions with less significant environmental ef-
fects."'93 "Segmentation" or "piecemealing" would occur if an
agency analyzed different phases of a single project as separate
projects in separate EAs to avoid conducting an EIS on the project
as a whole. Separately analyzing a separate and distinct project,
however, is legal and proper. In addition, "tiering" is also proper
and encouraged by the CEQ regulations. 94 When some or most of
the aspects of a proposed action have already been discussed in an
earlier EIS, an agency may "tier off' that earlier EIS with a more
succinct environmental analysis to avoid "repetitive discussions" of
the same issues.9 5 An EIS can also incorporate information by ref-
89. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d) (2001) (stating that alternatives for proposed
action must also include possibility of no action).
90. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994) (discussing
how federal agencies must address environmental concerns in minority and low-
income communities).
91. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (2001) (directing agencies to integrate National En-
vironmental Policy Act [hereinafter NEPA] process at "earliest possible time").
92. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 (a) (2) (2001) (stating limitation on actions that may be
taken by agency during NEPA process).
93. Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1142 (2d Cir. 1988) (defin-
ing "segmentation," or "piecemealing" and stating that it should be avoided so that
overall environmental impact is evaluated).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2001) (stating allowance of tiering in NEPA
process).
95. Id. (defining how tiering of EIS by agencies should be accomplished).
15
Wilcox: Special Issues in Environmental Law Involving Federal Agencies
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
54 VILIANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. XIV: p. 39
erence to other documents.9 6 If an agency chooses to produce an
EIS for a proposal, however, it cannot be "tiered off' another EIS,
because an EIS, by definition and practice, is a complete analysis of
an action.
Beyond the rudimentary requirements, the better and more
complete an EA or EIS, the more likely it is that the federal propo-
nent agency will prevail in a court challenge. Federal agencies must
apply a "rule of reason" to determine which factors to analyze.
Agencies are not required to merely speculate or conduct a "worst
case" analysis: 7 The purpose of the process is to ensure that fed-
eral agencies consider the environmental effects of their planned
projects and actions. Agencies must "give serious weight to environ-
mental factors" when making project decisions. -8 An "affected
party" who notices a defect or deficiency in an EA or an EIS may
have a legal cause of action. Early on, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the NEPA creates a right of action to enforce federal
agency obligations to consider environmental impacts of their ac-
tions.9  As a result, the NEPA is a ripe area for litigation against the
federal government and a means of holding it accountable. State
officials and the public can make use of a federal agency's NEPA
requirements to ensure that all potential environmental impacts of
a project are considered.
B. The Endangered Species Act
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 100 compliance will often occur
in concert with the NEPA process. Section 7 of the ESA requires
that federal agencies consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(Service) 101 to determine whether a proposed activity or project will
96. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21 (2001) (explaining how incorporation by refer-
ence can be accomplished).
97. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354-356
(1989) (explaining that at one time such "worst case" analysis was necessary under
CEQ regulations but those regulations have been amended).
98. Town of Huntington, 859 F.2d at 1141 (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secre-
tary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977)).
99. See generally United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 679-680 (1973) (discussing defendant's claim that
ICC action of freight rate increases would directly harm its use of natural resources
in Washington, D.C. area).
100. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (2001) (discussing aspects of Endan-
gered Species Act [hereinafter ESA]).
101. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (2001) (explaining which service is consulted).
Federal agencies consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding land-
based species and habitat or the National Marine and Fisheries Service regarding
ocean-based species and habitat. Id.
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subject any threatened or endangered species or its critical habitat
to 'jeopardy."' 02 When a federal agency proposes "major construc-
tion"'10 3 (or other activities having a similar impact on the environ-
ment) in an area where species included on the Endangered
Species List are present, it must prepare a "biological assess-
ment."10 4 The Service will prepare a "biological opinion" (BO) that
analyzes whether the proposed project or activity will jeopardize a
threatened or endangered species (or critical habitat)1 05 or
whether an "incidental take"10 6 will result that would jeopardize an
endangered species. 10 7 The Service will issue a BO that describes
the effects on the species, describes reasonable and prudent mea-
sures to minimize harm to the species and sets forth terms with
which the proponent agency must comply to implement its pro-
posed action.1" 8 If, after consultation, the Service still determines
that the activity will 'jeopardize" the species, the Service will issue a
'jeopardy opinion."109
Although there is a process for obtaining an exemption from
endangered species requirements for an agency action, 11 0 a finding
102. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (stating that agency must do consultation to de-
termine possible harm tinder ESA).
103. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001) (defining "major construction activity").
"Major construction activity" is a "construction project (or other undertaking hav-
ing similar physical impacts) which is a major Federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment as referred to in the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act." Id.
104. A "biological assessment" is "information prepared by or under the di-
rection of the [flederal agency concerning listed and proposed species and desig-
nated and proposed critical habitat that may be present in the action area and the
evaluation potential effects of the action on such species and habitat." Id.
105. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (2001) (discussing issuance of biological opinion);
see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001) (defining biological opinion). A "biological opin-
ion" states the opinion of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service "as to whether or not
the [flederal action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat." Id.
106. See C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001) (defining "incidental take"). This refers to
damage to a species or its critical habitat "that result[s] from, but [is] not the
purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity conducted by the [flederal
agency or applicant." Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (defining "take"). "Take" means
to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct. Id.
107. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2001) (explaining Agency review based upon af-
fected species or critical habitat).
108. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (explaining written statement provided by
Secretary if the Secretary concludes that agency action will not violate such subsec-
tion or taking is authorized); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (2001) (stating biologi-
cal opinion requirements).
109. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (3) (2001) (explaining biological opinion based
upon jeopardy to species or habitat).
110. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (stating process for receiving exemption).
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by the Service that an agency action would place a listed species in
jeopardy will normally terminate the proposed action. In Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,I" the snail darter, a tiny minnow-like fish,
shut down the massive Tellico Dam project. In the Supreme
Court's opinion, Justice Burger wrote, "[i] t may be curious to some
that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish
among all the countless millions of species extant would require the
permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress
has expended more than $100 million."' 12 Yet, that is exactly what
the provisions of the ESA required.' 3
Moreover, a BO from the Service finding that a federal activity
will not adversely impact an endangered species is not necessarily
the final word as to whether the federal activity can proceed. In
Center for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 114 an Arizona federal court
held that both the U.S. Army and the Service were arbitrary and
capricious in determining that activities at Fort Huachuca, Arizona
would not jeopardize the Huachuca water umbel, a rare plant, or
the Southwestern willow flycatcher, a rare bird. The decision con-
cerned the Army's efforts to create a plan to mitigate the effects of
groundwater pumping attributable to the Army's activities. The dis-
trict court judge wrote:
The whole premise of the "no jeopardy" ruling which is
that within three years the Army and other interested par-
ties will come up with a long-term plan to remedy the
groundwater deficit problem, is an admission that what is
currently on the table as far as mitigation measures is in-
adequate to support the [Service's] "no jeopardy"
decision.' 15
C. Wetlands Protection
Wetlands compliance"-, should occur in concert with the
NEPA process. Compliance generally requires the agency propo-
nent to coordinate with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or to
111. See generally Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
112. Id. at 172 (stating Justice Burger's comments on ESA appropriations).
113. Id. (stating Court's conclusion).
114. See Control for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D.
Ariz. 2002) (stating holding).
115. Id. at 1154 (stating that Army's mitigation measures were inadequate).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). This section requires a permit for the dis-
charge of dredged spoil or fill material into navigable waters. Id. "Navigable waters"
includes wetlands. See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121 (1985).
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol14/iss1/2
2003] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 57
request special permits. Wetlands compliance is a controversial and
difficult area of environmental law. At first glance, the law in this
area may appear to be straightforward, but in reality, it is quite
complex.
Under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, all discharges of
dredged or fill material into "waters of the United States" require a
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (or a state with per-
mitting authority). 117 "Waters of the United States" include wet-
lands that are adjacent to or tributary to other waters of the United
States.' 18 Courts have even found nonadjacent wetlands to be wa-
ters of the United States based on their use by migratory waterfowl
or interstate travelers, which constitutes a nexus to interstate com-
merce sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.' " 9 The Supreme
Court, however, overruled the "Migratory Bird Rule" in its 2001 de-
cision, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers. 120
"Wetlands" are areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support,
and that normally do support, vegetation that is typically adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions, including swamps, marshes,
bogs and similar areas.12' An area need not be saturated all year
long to constitute a wetland. 22 Further, the concept of discharge
or dredged or fill material can be broadly interpreted. Proposed
activities that affect a small creek bed or western arroyo, for instance,
could require a section 404 permit. The dredging or filling of a
wetland is not the only wetland activity that requires a permit.'
23
The incidental discharge into a wetland by bulldozers or military
tracked vehicles, for instance, could also trigger the requirement
for a section 404 permit. In those circumstances, the federal
agency will normally consult with the Corps of Engineers to deter-
117. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (requiring permit for filling wetlands).
118. See, e.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (holding that wetlands
adjacent to waters fall within EDA definition of waters of United States).
119. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); but
see generally Tabb Lakes Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.2d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (viewing
this approach with disfavor).
120. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (ruling that extending definition of "navigable wa-
ters" under CWA to include interstate waters used as migratory bird habitat ex-
ceeded corporation's authority under CWA).
121. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 129-30 (defining wetlands).
122. Id. (rejecting frequent flooding requirement in definition of wetlands).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (requiring permit for discharge of dredge and
fill materials).
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mine whether a section 404 permit is required. 124 Such consulta-
tion may even be required in desert environments. In addition,
with regard to any federal construction project that may damage
wetlands, Executive Order 11990 requires the proponent agency to
make a determination that "there is no practice alternative" to the
project and that the project includes "all practicable measures to
minimize harm to wetlands. '125
D. Cultural Resources Requirements
Another responsibility federal agencies must assume in envi-
ronmental planning comes from section 106 of the National His-
toric Preservation Act (NHPA).126 Under section 106, any federal
"undertaking"1 27 triggers a requirement to consult with the federal
government's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP)
regarding the fate of districts, sites, buildings, structures and objects
that are eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. 128
These areas include archeological sites as well as historic struc-
tures. 129 Ordinarily, properties younger than fifty years old will not
be considered eligible for the National Register. 30
Under the ACHP's regulations, when a federal agency deter-
mines that a proposed action falls within the NHPA definition of an
undertaking, the agency must consult with the state historic preser-
vation officer (SHPO).13 1 The agency must also solicit the views of
public and private organizations, Native Americans, local govern-
124. See id. § 1344(a) (delegating permitting authority to Corporation of
Engineers).
125. Exec. Order No. 11, 990, 42 Fed. Reg. 26, 961 (1977).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2000). In addition to section 106, section 110 of the
NHPA requires that federal agencies use their historic properties "to the maxi-
mum extent feasible" rather than acquire or construct new properties. Id. § 470h-
2. Section 110 also requires that federal agencies locate agency owned historic
properties and nominate those properties to the National Register of Historic
Places. Id.
127. "Undertaking" includes any project, activity or program that can result in
changes in the character or use of historic properties, if the historic properties are
located in the area of potential effects. Undertakings include new and continuing
projects, activities or programs and any of their elements not previously consid-
ered under section 106. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (stating effect of federal Undertakings upon property in
National Register of Historic Places).
129. For instance, archeologists at the U.S. Army's Fort Bliss, Texas estimate
that the installation has more than 15,000 archeological sites within its boundaries.
Interview with James Bowman, Chief Archeologist, Fort Bliss, Tex. (Nov. 12, 1997).
130. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2001) (stating criteria for national historic
preservation).
131. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (2001) (enumerating protocol for identification of
historic properties).
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ments and other groups that are likely to have knowledge of or con-
cerns with the Historic Register eligible properties. 132 The agency
may proceed with the proposed project or action only if: (i) the
agency determines that the project or action will have "no effect"
on Historic Register eligible properties; 133 (ii) the SHPO agrees
with that determination; and (iii) there are no objections raised
within fifteen days.134 If the agency determines that there is an ef-
fect but that it is not adverse and the SHPO agrees, then the agency
may make a "no adverse effect" determination and advise the
ACHP.
If there will be an adverse effect on historic properties, the
agency must notify the ACHP and enter negotiations with the
SHPO on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to avoid or miti-
gate the adverse effect. 135 The ACHP may enter this consultation
process with or without a request from either the agency or the
SHPO. 13 6 If the agency and the SHPO (and sometimes the ACHP)
cannot reach an agreement, only the head of the federal agency
(for example, the commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation)
may overrule the SHPO and the ACHP. The agency head may not
delegate this responsibility.' 3 7
Federal agencies must follow section 106 requirements when
they directly undertake federal activities and when they are involved
indirectly through funding, approving, permitting or licensing.' 38
In its regulations, the ACHP includes in its definition of a federal
undertaking "any project, activity, or program that can result in
changes in the character or use of historic properties, if any such
historic properties are located in the area of potential effects."' 39
Courts have interpreted "undertaking" to include a wide variety of
132. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (2001) (listing consulting parties).
133. This provision also applies to projects that will have no effect on the
"area of potential effects," defined as the geographic area or areas within which
the undertaking may cause changes in the character or use of historic properties.
Id. § 800.2(c) (2001).
134. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(b) (2001) (requiring consultation with SHPO).
135. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(d)(2) (2001) (refusing to further consultation
upon adverse effect finding).
136. Id. (specifying terms for council participation).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2 (a) (1) (2000) (stating that heads of all federal agen-
cies shall assure responsibility for preservation of historic properties owned by
agency).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7) (enumerating undertaking requirements).
139. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o) (2001).
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actions, including military operations,14 building leases, 141 land ex-
change agreements, 142 and revision of agency regulations.' 43
In addition to the NHPA, the Native American Graves Protec-
tion and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)1 44 and the Archeological Re-
sources Protection Act (ARPA)'145 can play important roles in the
federal environmental planning process. The NAGPRA requires
that all federal agencies (and museums) that possess "Native Ameri-
can human remains and associated funerary objects"'146 compile an
inventory and notify tribes that may have a cultural link to the re-
mains and associated objects. 147 If the tribe so desires, the agency
must return the remains and associated objects to the tribe. 148 The
agency must also provide a summary listing of "unassociated funer-
ary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony." 149  Because
newly discovered remains or tribal objects would fall under the pos-
session and control of the federal agency that discovers them, the
federal agency would be required to provide similar notification to
the tribes and give the tribes an opportunity for consultation and
140. See generally Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Stipp. 646 (D. P.R. 1979) (holding
that military operations constitute federal activities).
141. See generally Birmingham Realty Co. v. General Serv. Admin., 497 F. Supp.
1377 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (holding that building leases constitute federal activities).
142. See generally Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Babbitt, 40 F.3d 442
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that land exchange agreements constitute federal
activities).
143. See generally Illinois Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm'n, 848 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that changes to federal
agency regulations may constitute federal activities).
144. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2001) (establishing regulations related to
protection and care of Native American burial grounds).
145. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (2001) (establishing guidelines for archeo-
logical excavations of protected areas).
146. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). "Native American" means of or related to a
"tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States." Id.; see also
§ 3001 (3) (A). "Associated funerary objects" means objects that were a part of the
"death rite or ceremony of a culture" and were placed with the body at the time of
burial or later. Id.
147. 25 U.S.C. § 3003. Each federal agency and each museum which has pos-
session or control over holdings or collections of Native American human remains
and associated funerary objects shall compile an inventory of such items and, to
the extent possible based on information possessed by such museum or federal
agency, identify the geographical and cultural affiliation of such item. Id.
148. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (providing for repatriation of Native American human
remains and objects possessed or controlled by federal agencies and museums).
149. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (3) (B). "Unassociated funerary objects" include ob-
jects that are not presently under the control of the federal agency. Id.; see also 25
U.S.C. § 300] (3) (C). "Sacred objects" are specific ceremonial objects for the prac-
tice of Native American religions. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (3) (D). "Cultural
patrimony" includes objects that have cultural significance to an entire tribe,
rather than to an individual member of the tribe. Id.
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repatriation. Environmental planning in areas with a considerable
historic presence of Native Americans must consider the potential
effects of discovering Native American remains or tribal objects.
Failure to comply with these requirements may cause conflicts with
Native American tribes.
The ARPA provides requirements for the protection of archeo-
logical sites. If archeological resources1 5°1 are discovered during the
course of a federal activity, and if they must be excavated, the pro-
ponent must seek approval for the excavation from the federal land
manager.1 51 Unauthorized excavation is prohibited under the
ARPA.152 In addition, the incidental discovery of an archeological
site will trigger the requirements of section 106 of the NHPA.
E. Air Conformity Determinations
Section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 153 which was
adopted with the 1990 amendments to the CAA, requires that all
federal actions conform to any applicable state implementation
plan (SIP).154 Thus, federal facilities located in air pollution non-
attainment 55 and maintenance areas156 must ensure that any pro-
posed action conforms to the SIP. Under the EPA's implementing
regulations, a federal action means "any activity engaged in by a
department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal government,
or any activity that a department, agency, or instrumentality of the
Federal government supports in any way, provides financial assis-
tance for, licenses, permits, or approves .. .
150. See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc.
Archeological resource [means] any material remains of past human life
or activities which are of archeological interest . . . [including] pottery,
basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles, tools, structures, or por-
tions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings, rock carvings, intaglios,
graves, human skeletal remains, or any portion or piece of any of the
foregoing items.
Id.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b) (2000) (stating that "determination by Federal
Land Manager" is "prerequisite to issuance of permit").
152. See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee. (showing that "no person may excavate ... any
archeological resource ... unless such activity is pursuant to a permit issued tinder
section 470cc of this title."); see also 16 U.S.C. § 470hh (2001).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (2000).
154. See id. (determining "SIP" to be state's source-specific plan for meeting
air quality standards).
155. "Nonattainment areas" are areas that do not meet national air quality
standards for a particular pollutant. 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2001).
156. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.852 (2001) (defining "maintenance area" to be area
that meets air quality standards but must have a plan to keep its emissions in
compliance).
157. Id. (discussing maintenance area).
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The air conformity rule sets standards for maximum emissions
limits allowed for various air pollutants in non-attainment and
maintenance areas. 158 For actions exceeding these limits, the pro-
ponent federal agency must show that the action conforms to the
SIP.' 59 The federal agency can demonstrate conformity by indicat-
ing that the action is already accounted for in the SIP, that the
emissions are offset by emission reductions elsewhere within the
nonattainment or maintenance area or that the action does not
contribute to or increase the frequency of air standards
violations. 160
When making a conformity determination, a federal agency
"must consider comments from any interested parties."161 EPA reg-
ulations require a thirty-day notice and comment period. 162 The
proponent federal agency must also notify the EPA regional offices
and state and local air quality agencies of the project or action. 163
158. 40 C.F.R. § 51.853(b) (1) (2001) (showing acceptable amount of tons per
year allowed for each pollutant).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 51.851(b) (2001) (stating that federal conformity rules "es-
tablish the conformity criteria and procedures necessary to meet the act require-
ments until such time as the required conformity SIP revision is approved by
EPA.").
160. 40 C.F.R. § 51.858 (2001) (determining that pollutant must meet speci-
fied criteria enumerated in this section).
161. 40 C.F.R. § 51.854 (2001).
Any Federal department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal gov-
ernment taking an action subject to this subpart must make its own con-
formity determination consistent with the requirements of this subpart.
In making its conformity determination, a Federal agency must consider
comments from any interested parties. Where multiple Federal agencies
have jurisdiction for various aspects of a project, a Federal agency may
choose to adopt the analysis of another Federal agency may choose to
adopt the analysis of another Federal agency or develop its own analysis
in order to make its conformity determination.
Id.
162. 40 C.F.R. § 51.856(b) (2001).
A Federal agency must make public its draft conformity determination
under §51.858 by placing a notice by prominent advertisement in a daily
newspaper of general circulation in the area affected by the action and by
providing 30 days for written public comment prior to taking any formal
action on the draft determination. This comment period may be concur-
rent with any other public involvement, such as occurs in the NEPA
process.
Id.
163. 40 C.F.R. § 51.855(a) (2001).
A Federal agency making a conformity determination under 51.858 must
provide to the appropriate EPA Regional Office(s), State and local air
quality agencies and, where applicable, affected Federal land managers,
the agency designated under section 174 of the Act and the MPO a 30
day notice which describes the proposed action and the Federal agency's
draft conformity determination on the action.
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The conformity analysis will normally be conducted in conjunction
with the NEPA process because it is required prior to taking any
action and because it has a public notice requirement similar to the
NEPA's requirement. In its comments to the air conformity rule,
the EPA noted that "[f] ederal agencies should consider meeting
the conformity public participation requirements at the same time
as the NEPA requirements."1 64 This would allow the proponent
agency to streamline the conformity determination process yet re-
main consistent with its requirements.
F. Western Water Rights
For federal agencies that operate in the Western United States,
special rules regarding water rights also apply. The Western States
generally follow a legal regime known as the "Prior Appropriation
Doctrine" (Doctrine) in determining entitlement to scarce water re-
sources. The history of the Doctrine is tied closely to the history of
the West itself. The Doctrine was derived from the principles of
mining law, in which the first prospector to stake a claim was enti-
tled to work that claim exclusively. The first case to recognize a
right of prior appropriation was Irwin v. Phillips,165 which settled a
dispute over water rights between miners. As time passed, agricul-
tural irrigation replaced mining as the primary use of water in the
West and the Doctrine was applied to this new use as well. The
basis of the Doctrine, like its mining law precursor, is "first in time,
first in right.' 66 In other words, the first person to take water from
a stream and use it for a beneficial purpose becomes the "senior
appropriator," and his or her water right to the amount of water he
or she diverts is superior to all other subsequent or 'junior" appro-
priators. Beneficial uses normally include domestic uses, irrigation,
industrial uses and general municipal uses. Sometimes they in-
clude aesthetic uses as well, such as swimming or boating.1 67 Water
rights are typically monitored intensely by local associations of ap-
propriators (often known as ditch companies), by local water dis-
164. See 58 Fed. Reg. 63,214 (Nov. 30, 1993).
165. 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855) (finding that right by prior appropriation is firmly
fixed by universal sense of necessity and propriety).
166. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 104 (1984) (explain-
ing that priority is essential feature of doctrine of prior appropriation and person
whose appropriation is first in time has highest priority).
167. See AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION, WATER RIGHTS OF THE Fvrv
STATES AND TERRITORIES 26 (1990) [hereinafter AWWA].
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tricts and by state officials. The Doctrine, however, does not
require that water rights be used either. efficiently or wisely.' 68
Under the Doctrine, an appropriator can change the benefi-
cial use of the water or transfer a water right to another party. An
appropriator can change the point of diversion or the type of use,
but only under conditions that would protect the rights of other
appropriators.1 9 Water rights may be lost if they are not used con-
sistently and beneficially. Failure to use a water right coupled with
an intent to forfeit the right constitutes abandonment, freeing the
right for appropriation by another party. 171 In some states, statutes
specify that nonuse for a specified period of time constitutes
forfeiture. 171
The Doctrine is not uniformly applied throughout the Western
States. Nine states have adopted a pure form of the Doctrine,
known as the "Colorado Doctrine."'172 Ten states follow a hybrid
water law system, which incorporates elements of riparian rights as
well as prior appropriation. 73 While federal facilities enjoy some
distinct advantages over private users in the Western States, federal
attorneys and engineers must be keenly aware of water rights sys-
tems in their respective states.
The biggest advantage federal agencies enjoy is derived from
the Supreme Court's 1908 decision in Winters v. United States.' 74
The Winters Court held that, although no mention of water rights
was made at the time lands were reserved for two Native American
tribes in Montana, the reservation by the federal government of the
land for the tribes constituted an implied reservation of water rights
to support the tribes' agricultural pursuits, which was the purpose
of the creation of the reservation. 175
168. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water Law: Think-
ing Perpendicular to the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, XXIV LAND & WATER L. REv. 1,
12 (1989) (criticizing bad economics of classic prior appropriation doctrine and
arguing for reform).
169. See AWWA, supra note 167, at 27-28.
170. See id. at 28.
17 1. See id.
172. See generally Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (defining
"Colorado Doctrine"). In addition to Colorado, the states of New Mexico, Wyo-
ming, Montana, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona and Alaska follow the "Colorado
Doctrine."
173. The hybrid states are Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, Oklahoma, Washington, California, Oregon and Mississippi.
174. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (finding that govern-
ment reserved waters for use necessarily continued through years).
175. See id. at 576-77 (finding that no act of Congress destroyed reservation).
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The so-called Winters Doctrine was expanded in Cappaert v.
United States,176 which held that the United States was entitled to
instream flows of groundwater needed to support a species of wild-
life at a national monument. 177 The Court stressed that, because
the proclamation creating the park referred specifically to a rare
and unusual species of fish living in Devil's Hole, an underground
spring at Death Valley National Monument, protection of that spe-
cies was implied as a purpose for the reservation of the land. 178
The Court held that the United States, in reserving public land for
a specific purpose, was entitled to all previously unappropriated wa-
ters "necessary to accomplish the purposes for which, the reserva-
tion was created."179
In United States v. New Mexico, 180 the Supreme Court rejected
the U.S. Forest Service's efforts to protect instream flows for aes-
thetic, recreational and fish-preservation purposes in the Gila Na-
tional Forest in New Mexico. In New Mexico, the majority based its
decision on the notion that protection of instream flows for aes-
thetic purposes was outside the "relatively narrow purposes for
which national forests were to be reserved."18' In his dissent, Jus-
tice Powell questioned whether "the forests which Congress in-
tended to 'improve and protect' are the still, silent, lifeless places
envisioned by the Court ... the forests consist of the birds, animals,
and fish - the wildlife - that inhabit them, as well as the trees, flow-
ers, shrubs and grasses."' 8 2
Significantly, the New Mexico decision illustrates the Court's re-
luctance to stretch the reserved water right beyond the purpose of
the reservation of the land. Federal agencies that have responsibili-
ties under the ESA or other statutes may have to work within the
state appropriation system to acquire sufficient water rights to pro-
tect species. This sometimes makes it difficult for federal agencies
176. 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (answering question of whether reservation of site as
national monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated water).
177. See id. at 147 (finding that when United States reserved Devil's Hole it
acquired by reservation water rights).
178. See id. at 140-42 (noting that proclamation referred to "peculiar race of
desert fish" and that pool was of outstanding scientific importance").
179. See id. at 139 (explaining when intent to reserve water is inferred).
180. 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (rejecting notion of implied intent to reserve water
rights when public land is reserved strictly for aesthetic or recreational purpose).
181. See id. at 709 (holding that national forests were reserved for two primary
purposes: timber preservation and enhancement of water supply).
182. See id. at 719 (arguing that he would hold that United States is entitled to
as much water as is necessary to sustain wildlife of forests, including plants).
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to balance their legal obligations under the ESA and other environ-
mental statutes with the demands of other water users. 183
For challenges to a federal agency's water rights under state
systems, however, the McCarran Amendment' 84 provides only a lim-
ited waiver of sovereign immunity. This statute grants state jurisdic-
tion over the United States in any suit:
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or other source or (2) for the administration
of such rights, where it appears that the United States is
the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights
by appropriation under state law, by purchase, by ex-
change, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit.185
The statute only applies to "general adjudications" involving all the
water rights of all appropriators on a stream. 18 6 It does not waive
sovereign immunity for challenges by individuals against the United
States seeking to determine their relative priorities as against the
United States. 187
A unique feature of the waiver of sovereign immunity under
the McCarran Amendment is that it requires the federal govern-
ment to defend itself in state courts.'8 8 This differs from the pro-
cess familiar to most federal attorneys, which calls for immediate
removal to federal district court. 8 9 Thus, the McCarran Amend-
ment sacrifices the "home field advantage" federal attorneys nor-
mally enjoy. The rationale behind allowing the state adjudication
process to consider federal water rights within the states is the as-
183. See generally William A. Wilcox, Western Flood Management in the 21st Cen-
tury: A Tightrope Between Competing Values, W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 153 (discuss-
ing balance that must be reached between private interest in water rights and
Federal interest in water rights necessary to preserve wildlife and environment).
184. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2000) (describing suits in which consent is given to
join United States as defendant in certain environmental actions).
185. See id. (outlining two circumstances in which U.S. may be subject to state
regulations)
186. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963) (distinguishing Dugan as
private suit rather than general adjudication).
187. See Michael D. White, McCarran Amendment Adjudications - Problems, Solu-
tion, Alternatives, XXII LAND & WATER L. REV. 619, 621 (1987) (explaining that
general state adjudications included multitude of parties whose ability to overcome
doctrine of sovereign immunity may differ).
188. See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (stating that United States waives any right to
plead that state laws are inapplicable and does not have right to remove case to
federal court).
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000) (providing for removal to district court of
most claims against U.S.).
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sumption that states are better equipped to deal with complex
water rights questions. This rationale is not uniformly agreed
upon. "There is nothing about the reserved right," one critic wrote,
"that cannot be fully and more simply resolved consistent with prin-
ciples of federalism in a federal court declaratory judgment action,
if the parties were willing to see it done that way."' 90
IV. CONCLUSION
While the federal government constitutes one of the largest in-
dustries in the United States and is a major consumer of natural
resources, much of the conventional regime of state environmental
laws either does not apply to the federal government or must be
applied under special rules. This creates a perplexing problem for
state environmental regulators and the public, who wish to ensure
that environmental requirements are carried out equally by all enti-
ties. It appears to be a matter of simple fairness to hold federal
agencies as accountable for their actions as all other entities.
Federal agencies do indeed follow their own set of rules with
respect to environmental law. In some cases, sovereign immunity
may provide a shield to regulation under state law. Some of the
federal agencies' regulations, however, are significantly more strin-
gent than regulations that apply to any state or private entities. En-
vironmental planning regulations, for instance, afford the public
and state and local governments an opportunity to shape federal
programs and projects at their inception. When dealing with the
federal government in the arena of environmental and natural re-
sources law, practitioners must understand the special issues that
arise involving environmental regulation and environmental plan-
ning. Only then can they enforce state environmental law against
federal agencies effectively.
190. SeeJoseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism, and the.
Trust Responsibility, XXVII LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 4 (1992) (arguing thatjurisdic-
tion of all actions affecting Indian water rights should be in United States District
Court).
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